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SYMPOSIUM 
 
Dredging up the Past: 
Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance 
Anita L. Allen† 
What if I stored everything, what would it mean, what are the 
implications? We don’t know.  
—Jim Gemmell
1
 
An exhibit at the 1939 New York World’s Fair popularized the 
idea of preserving a comprehensive depiction of human life in a com-
pact medium of storage. The Westinghouse Corporation stuffed a re-
membrance of America into a glass container sealed inside an 800 
pound, bullet-shaped canister made of copper, chromium, and silver.
2
 
Today, we use the term “time capsule” to describe just about anything 
intended to preserve the past for the future. The original Westing-
house time capsule housed specific articles selected by a committee 
formed to design an optimal record of national life for retrieval in five 
millennia. The Westinghouse Committee stocked its time capsule with 
small commonly used articles, textiles and materials, and miscellany 
including books, money, seeds, and scientific and electrical devices. The 
Committee also elected to store documents on microfilm, a newsreel 
of current events, and messages from Albert Einstein and other 
“noted men of our time.” In case the world forgets, a time capsule af-
fords a means to remember.  
In 1974, the artist Andy Warhol began what was described as a 
“time capsule” project of his own,
3
 a query of his generation’s notions 
 
 
 † Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 1 Alec Wilkinson, Remember This? A Project to Record Everything We Do In Life, New 
Yorker 38, 39 (May 28, 2007). 
 2 A New York Times–sponsored webpage lists the complete contents of the Westinghouse 
time capsule. See 1939 Westinghouse Time Capsule Complete List Contents, NY Times Mag 
(1996), online at http://www.nytimes.com/specials/magazine3/items.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 3 For a description of Andy Warhol’s time capsule project, see The Warhol: Collec-
tions/Archives (The Andy Warhol Museum 2007), online at http://www.warhol.org/collections/ 
archives.html (visited Jan 12, 2008): 
This serial work, spanning a thirty-year period from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, con-
sists of 610 standard sized cardboard boxes, which Warhol, beginning in 1974, filled, sealed 
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of transience, permanence, and history. Warhol’s medium of storage 
was ordinary cardboard boxes. Rather than attempting to fill the 
boxes with artifacts of collective importance, Warhol preserved ran-
dom items that accumulated on and around his own desktop.
4
 When a 
particular box was full, Warhol closed, dated, and stored it. Warhol 
died in 1987, leaving for the future a solipsistic collection of personal 
clutter. The Andy Warhol Museum in Pittsburgh houses 610 of the 
artist’s cardboard boxes, preserving details of his unique life and fre-
netic social milieu. Ironically, because Warhol evolved from celebrity 
artist to cultural icon, his campy, fragile, self-involved time capsules 
preserved collective remembrance after all. Long into the future, trash 
or treasure, his boxes are being inventoried, catalogued, photo-
graphed, studied and conserved in light-, humidity-, temperature-, and 
access-controlled rooms.  
Andy Warhol deliberately wove archiving into the fabric of his 
everyday life for years, allowing the happenstance of solitary and so-
cial experience to substantially dictate the items he saved. Warhol thus 
represents a drift in emphasis from ceremonial, episodic preservation 
of the memory of a whole, imminent society (illustrated by the West-
inghouse time capsule), to informal, continuous preservation of the 
memory of a single, singular individual. Andy Warhol’s art project has 
significance for another reason. It bridges the gap between the quasi-
scientific futurism of twentieth century time-capsuling and the techno-
logical conceit of twenty-first century “lifelogging.”  
I.  LIFELOGGING 
The term “lifelog” refers to a comprehensive archive of an indi-
vidual’s quotidian existence, created with the help of pervasive com-
puting technologies: “A life-log is conceived as a form of pervasive 
computing consisting of a unified digital record of the totality of an 
individual’s experiences, captured multimodally through digital sen-
sors and stored permanently as a personal multimedia archive.”
5
 
                                                                                                                           
 
and sent to storage. . . . Photographs, newspapers and magazines, fan letters, business and 
personal correspondence, art work, source images for art-work, books, exhibition cata-
logues, and telephone messages, along with objects and countless examples of ephemera, 
such as announcements for poetry readings and dinner invitations, were placed on an al-
most daily basis into a box kept conveniently next to his desk. 
 4 See id. For an account of contemporary views on Andy Warhol, see Robin Pogrebin, A 
Portrait of an Artist Both Loved and Hated, NY Times E1, E8 (Sept 20, 2006). 
 5 Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin, Outlines of a World Coming into Existence: Pervasive 
Computing and the Ethics of Forgetting, 34 Envir & Planning B: Planning & Design 431, 431 
(2007). See also Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin, The Ethics of Forgetting in an Age of Pervasive 
Computing 1 (CASA Working Paper Series 92, Mar 2005), online at http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/ 
working_papers/paper92.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (characterizing lifelogs, among other things, as 
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Lifelog technologies would record and store everyday conversations, 
actions, and experiences of their users, enabling future replay and aiding 
remembrance. The emergent interest in the concept of lifelogging stems 
from the growing capacity to store and retrieve traces of one’s life via 
computing devices. Products to assist lifelogging are already on the 
market,
6
 but the technology that will enable people fully and continu-
ously to document their entire lives is still in the research and develop-
ment phase.
7
 Creative inventors like Steve Mann have led the way.
8
 
“MyLifeBits” is the name of a Microsoft Company–sponsored 
full-life lifelogging project conceived in 1998 to explore the potential 
of digitally chronicling a person’s life.
9
 MyLifeBits focuses on preserv-
ing the life of veteran researcher Gordon Bell.
10
 MyLifeBits is high 
concept, high tech, labor intensive, and Warhol-like: continuous stor-
age of a life in durable electronics rather than paper cartons.
11
 Using 
an infrared “SenseCam” camera worn around his neck, scanners, and 
computing devices, Mr. Bell records nearly all of his conversations and 
experiences. He stores them electronically, along with documents, pho-
tographs and memorabilia chronicling his past. In addition, Mr. Bell 
electronically preserves all of his email, typed documents, and web-
page visits. Although Mr. Bell makes use of a human assistant and an 
ad hoc array of clunky wearable and desktop devices requiring self-
conscious acts of collection and storage, technologists imagine a future 
of automatic, customizable, continuous, and virtually “invisible” 
                                                                                                                           
“socio-spatial archives that document every action, every event, every conversation, and every 
material expression of an individual’s life”). 
 6 A Nokia product, Lifeblog, archives cell phone messages and photographs. See Mark 
Ward, Log Your Life via Your Phone, BBC News Online (2004), online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/technology/3497596.stm (visited Jan 12, 2008). Weblog technology that enables users to 
record thoughts, photos, video, and audio is being marketed under the “lifelog” rubric. See, for 
example, Real Life Log, online at http://www.reallifelog.com (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 7 See generally Dodge and Kitchin, 34 Envir & Planning B: Planning & Design 431 (cited 
in note 5). 
 8 University of Toronto professor Steve Mann has been a pioneer in the field of wearable 
computers, countersurveillance, and lifelogging. See Steve Mann, Personal Web Page, online at 
http://wearcam.org/steve.html (visited Jan 12, 2008); EyeTap Personal Imaging Lab (University 
of Toronto), online at http://www.eyetap.org/about_us/people/index.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
See also Frank Nack, You Must Remember This, 12 IEEE Multimedia 4, 5 (2005), online at 
http://www.eyetap.org/papers/docs/ieee_media.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (comparing Mann’s 
“Eye Tap” lifelogger, which alters the image of the world presented to the logger, to MyLifeBits). 
 9 See Wilkinson, Remember This?, New Yorker at 39 (cited in note 1), quoting Jim Gem-
mell. See also Gordon Bell and Jim Gemmell, A Digital Life, Scientific Am 58, 58–60 (Mar 2007) 
(tracing lifelogging from its origins in post-WWII technologies to the present and hypothesizing 
about future inroads lifelogging may make into daily lives). 
 10 Bell and Gemmell, A Digital Life, Scientific Am at 62 (cited in note 9). 
 11 Electronic media of storage raise problems of transience. Bell recognizes that parts of 
his archive could become unreadable one day. If the current compression standard for photos 
(.jpeg) were supplanted, for example, stored images would become inaccessible. See Wilkinson, 
Remember This?, New Yorker at 44 (cited in note 1). 
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lifeloggers. Lifelogging devices will be inexpensive in the future, too. 
Mr. Bell estimates that sixty years of human experience constitutes 
one terabyte of data. That amount of data can be stored on a $600 
hard drive today, but tomorrow will be storable on cheap cell phones, 
as cheap as Andy Warhol’s cardboard boxes.
12
  
Biological memory serves us well, but it is highly selective and 
fallible.
13
 We do not remember all of our conscious experiences; we 
misremember many of our experiences; and memory fades over time.
14
 
Even what is objectively memorable can be forgotten. Stricken with 
Alzheimer’s Disease, Ronald Reagan likely forgot he had been Presi-
dent of the United States.
15
 To address the problem of fallible memory, 
the ancients relied on mnemotechnology, storytelling, pictures, and, 
eventually uniform systems of writing.
16
 Lifelog innovators are promis-
ing to better the ancients with their memory machines. The idea of a 
memory machine was once pure fantasy.
17
 But technologists predict 
that full-life lifelogging devices will one day be integrated into every-
day existence, becoming as ordinary as telephones.
18
 Ancillaries to 
memory, lifelogs will enable unprecedented accurate retention and re-
call of personal life. By design, lifelogs could be substantially less selec-
tive and less fallible than human memories stored only in the brain.  
Envisioning a less fallible and selective adjunct to human mem-
ory, Total Recall is a lifelog research project of the Internet Multime-
dia Lab of the University of Southern California.
19
 Total Recall re-
                                                                                                                           
 
 12 Clive Thompson, A Head for Detail, Fast Company 73, 77 (Nov 2006). 
 13 See generally Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and 
Remembers (Houghton Mifflin 2001) (classifying memory malfunctions into seven categories, 
based upon the malfunctions’ relationships to otherwise positive neurological functions). 
 14 See, for example, H. Branch Coslett, Consciousness and Attention, 17 Seminars in Neu-
rology 137, 137–39 (1997), in which a memory and brain disorder researcher describes the rela-
tionship between attention and consciousness. 
 15 See David Shenk, “Does He Remember Being President?”: The Downward Spiral of 
Ronald Reagan’s Alzheimer’s, Beliefnet.com (2006), online at http://www.beliefnet.com/story/147/ 
story_14713_1.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 16 See, for example, Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory 55 (Chicago 1966) (describing 
how ancient Greek and Roman authors developed a “mnemotechnology” of improving the 
ability to remember details of argument and perspective by associating ideas with visual, often 
architectural imagery).  
 17 See José Van Dijck, From Shoe Box to Performative Agent: The Computer as a Personal 
Memory Machine, 7 New Media and Socy 311, 314–16 (2005) (describing the “Memex” machine 
fantasy introduced in Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, Atlantic Monthly 101, 106 (July 1945)).  
 18 See Van Dijck, 7 New Media & Socy at 319–24 (cited in note 17) (describing Lifestreams, 
Memories for Life, and MyLifeBits visionary lifelog projects, all aimed at preserving life experi-
ences in a seamless, invisible way that exploits digital technologies). 
 19 For a description of the Total Recall project at the University of Southern California, see 
University of Southern California Multimedia Lab, Total Recall: A Personal Information Man-
agement System (2005), online at http://bourbon.usc.edu/iml/recall (visited Jan 12, 2008): 
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searchers maintain that technologies to “amass memories, experiences, 
and ultimately knowledge from an individual perspective” through the 
use of personal sensors and recording devices will “likely change our 
social structure.”
20
 They anticipate mostly positive changes and net 
benefits relating to education, law enforcement, health care, and sense 
and memory enhancement for the disabled.
21
  
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is 
the central research and development arm of the Department of De-
fense.
22
 In 2003, DARPA solicited proposals for a lifelog technology 
project with possible military applications. The lifelog technology 
DARPA conceived “can be used as a stand-alone system to serve as a 
powerful automated multimedia diary and scrapbook.”
23
 Moreover, 
“[b]y using a search engine interface,” the user of the lifelog DARPA 
hoped to create could “easily retrieve a specific thread of past transac-
tions, or recall an experience from a few seconds ago or from many 
years earlier in as much detail as is desired, including imagery, audio, 
or video replay of the event.”
24
 Project LifeLog was short-lived; but 
during its evocative span, it invited the public to imagine the greater 
effectiveness of military commanders equipped with lifelogs and with 
access to lifelog data concerning the experiences of their troops.
25
  
For generals, edgy artists, and sentimental grandmothers alike, 
lifelogging could someday replace or complement existing memory 
preservation practices. Like a traditional diary, journal, or daybook, 
the lifelog could preserve subjectively noteworthy facts and impres-
                                                                                                                           
The aim for the Total Recall project is to design and develop a personal information man-
agement system which will securely collect, store, and disseminate data from a variety of 
personal sensors. It will also allow customizable searching, analysis, and querying of this 
data, in a secure manner. Numerous applications of such systems will play an important role 
in improving people’s quality of life. 
See also William Cheng, Leana Golubchik, and David Kay, Total Recall: Are Privacy Changes 
Inevitable?, Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Continuous Archival and Retrieval of 
Personal Experiences 86 (Oct 15, 2004) (proposing a complex encryption framework as a solu-
tion to privacy concerns in a lifelogging world). 
 20 Cheng, Golubchik, and Kay, Total Recall at 86 (cited in note 19). See also Thompson, A 
Head for Detail, Fast Company at 76–78 (cited in note 12) (reporting on Gordon Bell’s lifelog-
ging projects and suggesting that Bell’s rituals may soon become mainstream). 
 21 Cheng, Golubchik, and Kay, Total Recall at 86 (cited in note 19). 
 22 For a general description of its mission, see DARPA’s website, online at 
http://www.darpa.mil (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 23 DARPA, LifeLog Proposer Information Pamphlet, SOL BAA 03-30 (2003), available 
online at http://web.archive.org/web/20030603173339/http%3a//www.darpa.mil/ipto/Solicitations/ 
PIP_03-30.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 24 Id. 
 25 DARPA abandoned its LifeLog project. See id. The LifeLog Project was not related to 
the controversial Terrorism (originally Total) Information Awareness, which was a scheme to use 
data mining to piece together profiles of individuals. See generally Shane Harris, Administration: 
TIA Lives On, Natl J 66 (Feb 25, 2006). 
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sions. Like an old-fashioned photo album, scrapbook, or home video, 
it could retain images of childhood, loved ones, and travels. Like a 
cardboard box time capsule or filing cabinet, it could store correspon-
dence and documents. Like personal computing software, it could re-
cord communications data, keystrokes, and internet trails. The lifelog 
could easily store data pertaining to purely biological states derived 
from continuous self-monitoring of, for example, heart rate, respira-
tion, blood sugar, blood pressure, and arousal. 
II.  THE APPEAL OF THE LIFELOG 
Is informal, continuous preservation of individuals’ experiences 
using durable electronics a good thing? What is the value of creating 
an ultra-detailed electronic record of one’s own existence? Why would 
anyone want to make a multimedia record of her entire life? The answer 
may be that our experiences and achievements comprise our unique-
ness; preserving a record of them preserves a record of us. Lifelogging 
feeds the inner King Tut—the side of us that rejects transience through 
mummification, relic, and entombment. But lifelogging is also journal-
ing, art, entertainment, and communication. Innovators expect lifelog-
ging products to emerge as serious tools for improving the quality of 
life. In its favor, lifelogging might encourage introspection and self-
knowledge. The capacity to share lifelogs could increase intimacy, un-
derstanding, and accountability in personal relationships. Inheriting the 
lifelog of a deceased parent, spouse, or child could help preserve family 
history and ease the pain of loss. Replay and remembrance machines 
could make us better at caretaking, work, and professional responsibil-
ity, too. Finally, lifelogs might enhance personal security. A potential 
mugger or rapist would have to think twice in a society of lifeloggers.  
To the extent that it preserves personal experience for voluntary 
private consumption, electronic lifelogging looks innocent enough, as 
innocent as Blackberries, home movies, and snapshots in silver picture 
frames. But lifelogging could fuel excessive self-absorption, since users 
would be engaged in making multimedia presentations about them-
selves all the time. The availability of lifelogging technology might lead 
individuals to overvalue the otherwise transient details of their lives. 
With all due respect to Pico Della Mirandola’s majestic humanism
26
 and 
                                                                                                                           
 
 26 See generally Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (Henry 
Regnery 1956) (A. Robert Caponigri, trans). 
I have figured out why man is the most fortunate of all creatures and as a result worthy of 
the highest admiration and earning his rank on the chain of being, a rank to be envied not 
merely by the beasts but by the stars themselves and by the spiritual natures beyond and 
above this world. This miracle goes past faith and wonder. And why not? It is for this reason 
that man is rightfully named a magnificent miracle and a wondrous creation. . . . Finally, the 
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Immanuel Kant’s enlightened liberalism,
27
 most of every human life is 
as fungible and forgettable as a mass-produced soup can.
28
 Further-
more, the potential would be great for incivility, emotional blackmail, 
exploitation, prosecution, and social control surrounding lifelog crea-
tion, content, and accessibility. This parry of the costs and benefits 
commences a fuller discussion of lifelogging’s implications. 
III.  GENERAL QUESTIONS 
The concept of lifelogging engenders numerous questions. What 
would it mean for society if typical individuals retained a detailed re-
cord of their entire lives? In a world of lifelogs, what would happen to 
beneficial forgetting, breaking with the past, and moving on? What 
would it mean for interpersonal relationships to know that shared 
experiences are probably being recorded? How will intimacy, confi-
dentiality, and privacy be affected? Question of freedom and compul-
sion arise. Who will have the right to forbid, restrict, initiate, or require 
lifelogging? And what of power relations? Won’t the powerful become 
even more powerful if lifelogging can be imposed and lifelogging con-
tent may be accessed by others? Who will have the right to access the 
                                                                                                                           
Great Artisan mandated that this creature who would receive nothing proper to himself 
shall have joint possession of whatever nature had been given to any other creature. He 
made man a creature of indeterminate and indifferent nature, and, placing him in the mid-
dle of the world, said to him “Adam, we give you no fixed place to live, no form that is pecu-
liar to you, nor any function that is yours alone. According to your desires and judgement, 
you will have and possess whatever place to live, whatever form, and whatever functions 
you yourself choose. All other things have a limited and fixed nature prescribed and 
bounded by Our laws. You, with no limit or no bound, may choose for yourself the limits 
and bounds of your nature. We have placed you at the world’s center so that you may sur-
vey everything else in the world. We have made you neither of heavenly nor of earthly stuff, 
neither mortal nor immortal, so that with free choice and dignity, you may fashion yourself 
into whatever form you choose. To you is granted the power of degrading yourself into the 
lower forms of life, the beasts, and to you is granted the power, contained in your intellect 
and judgement, to be reborn into the higher forms, the divine.” Imagine! The great generos-
ity of God! The happiness of man! To man it is allowed to be whatever he chooses to be! 
Pico Della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (Wisconsin State University 1996) (Richard 
Hooker, trans), online at http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/REN/ORATION.HTM (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 27 Immanuel Kant, What Is Enlightenment?, in Lewis White Beck, ed, Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals and What Is Enlightenment? 85 (Liberal Arts 1959): 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the in-
ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-
imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage 
to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] “Have courage to 
use your own understanding!”—that is the motto of enlightenment. 
 28 I allude, of course, to Andy Warhol’s famous canvases depicting Campbell’s soup cans, 
which render a mundane generic object into something of interest. See generally The Warhol: 
Resources and Lessons: Campbell’s: Ode to Food (The Andy Warhol Museum 2007), online at 
http://edu.warhol.org/aract_soup.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
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content of a person’s lifelog? What, especially, will be the lifelogging-
related entitlements of parents, employers, and the government? And 
what of access by spouses, researchers, business partners, accountants, 
lawyers, and private physicians presumed to have confidential and/or 
fiduciary relationships with the individual? 
Lifelogging preserves individually produced “capta”—“units of 
data that have been selected and harvested from the sum of potential 
data.”
29
 Because lifelog data is conceived as self-produced, Martin 
Dodge and Rob Kitchin have characterized lifelogging as personal 
“sousveillance.”
30
 Lifelogging has sousveillance and surveillance di-
mensions.
31
 It is sousveillance to the extent that it captures data about 
oneself or from the perspective of oneself. But it is surveillance to the 
extent that it is designed to capture data about others, including others 
who may also be engaged in acts of sousveillance or surveillance. 
Gordon Bell’s MyLifeBits infrared SenseCam indiscriminately photo-
graphs warm objects in its view, including people. Human individuals 
live social rather than solitary lives. One person’s comprehensive, full-
life lifelog would inevitably capture biography and expressions of the 
lives of other persons. How, if at all, should the capture and surveil-
lance implicit in personal sousveillance be regulated?
32
 How can secu-
                                                                                                                           
 
 29 See Dodge and Kitchin, 34 Envir & Planning B: Planning & Design at 432 (cited in note 5). 
 30 Id at 434. They borrow the term “sousveillance” from Steve Mann. See id, citing Steve 
Mann, Jason Nolan, and Barry Wellman, Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing 
Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 Surveillance and Socy 331, 332 (2003).  
 31 See Steve Mann, Equiveillance: The Equilibrium between Sur-veillance and Sous-
veillance 2 (On the Identity Trail, May 2005), online at http://www.idtrail.org/files/Mann,%20 
Equiveillance.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008): 
Surveillance is derived from French “sur” (above) and “veiller” (to watch). Typically 
(though not necessarily) surveillance cameras look down from above, both physically (from 
high poles) as well as hierarchically (bosses watching employees, citizens watching police, 
cab drivers photographing passengers, and shopkeepers videotaping shoppers). Likewise 
Sousveillance, derived from French “sous” (below) and “veiller” (to watch), is the art, sci-
ence, and technologies of “People Looking at”. Sousveillance does not immediately concern 
itself with what the people are looking at, any more than surveillance concerns itself with 
who or what is doing the looking. Instead, sousveillance typically involves small person-
centric imaging technologies, whereas surveillance tends to be architecture or enviro-
centric (cameras in or on the architecture or environment around us). Sousveillance does 
not necessarily limit itself to citizens photographing police, shoppers photographing shop-
keepers, etc., any more than surveillance limits itself along similar lines. For example, one 
surveillance camera may be pointed at another, just as one person may sousveill another. 
Sousveillance therefore expands the range of possibilities, without limitation to the possibil-
ity of going both ways in an up-down hierarchy. With the miniaturization of cameras into 
portable electronic devices, such as camera phones, there has been an increased awareness 
of sousveillance (more than 30,000 articles, references, and citations on the word “sousveil-
lance” alone), and we are ready to see a new industry grow around devices that implement 
sousveillance, together with a new sousveillance services industry. 
 32 See, for example, Philip Agre, Surveillance and Capture: Two Models of Privacy, 10 Info 
Socy 101, 105–07 (1994) (contrasting metaphorical understandings of privacy). A given person 
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rity against harmful falsification, deletion, data breaches, or identity 
theft be assured? Would lifelogs turn individuals into surveillance 
partners of government? How much access should the government 
have to an individual’s lifelog for national security, law enforcement, 
public health, tax compliance, and routine administrative purposes? 
The ethical and legal implications of lifelogging merit the serious at-
tention it is beginning to receive.  
IV.  PRIVACY CONCERNS 
The more comprehensive and continuous the lifelogging, the 
more significant the ethical and legal problems. Two of the most obvi-
ous and important such problems raised by comprehensive, full-life 
lifelogging are (1) pernicious records, recall, replay, and remem-
brance—for short, pernicious “memory”; and (2) pernicious surveil-
lance. Both involve threats to privacy. Privacy concerns arise because 
lifelogs are not destined solely for storage until the subject’s death, 
like Warhol’s cardboard boxes, or sealed for five thousand years, like a 
World’s Fair time capsule. By design, lifelog capta will be accessible 
and useable. Moreover, the act of capturing data itself implicates pri-
vacy concerns of all sorts, not just informational privacy and data pro-
tection.
33
 The DARPA LifeLog project was abandoned due to con-
cerns raised about the privacy implications both of the research proto-
col and the ultimate products of the research.
34
 Memory can be a very 
good thing, but it can also encourage harmfully dredging up or revisit-
ing past conduct. Surveillance can also be a very good thing, but it 
                                                                                                                           
may or may not specifically intend “surveillance” and yet collect (“capture”) data of the sort that 
would result from intentionally spying on others. 
 33 By privacy concerns of all sorts, I mean concerns about access to data/information, people, 
the attributes of identity, their intimate decisions and relationships—informational, physical, pro-
prietary, decisional, and associational forms of privacy. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law and Society 
3–6 (West 2007) (discussing the various meanings various speakers ascribe to the word “privacy”); 
Anita Allen, Privacy, in William G. Staples, ed, 2 Encyclopedia of Privacy 393 (Greenwood 2007). 
 34 DARPA modified its original call for proposals to acknowledge research ethics and 
other ethical, legal, and social implications. See DARPA, LifeLog Modification 3, SOL BAA 03-30 
(2004), available online at http://web.archive.org/web/20030621133355/www.darpa.mil/ipto/solicita-
tions/Mod3_03-30.html (visited Jan 12, 2008): 
The purpose of this modification is to reiterate this requirement and to provide clarification 
guidance regarding the capture by LifeLog sensors of imagery and audio of people other 
than the user of the LifeLog system. . . . LifeLog researchers shall obey all applicable privacy 
laws and regulations, and shall avoid even the appearance of the invasion of privacy. LifeLog 
physical data capture systems shall allow the LifeLog user to dynamically activate and deacti-
vate the recording of audio and video, independent of data stream processing such as using 
optical flow or ambient light and noise to measure motion or transitions between indoors and 
outdoors. LifeLog researchers shall not capture imagery or audio of any person without 
that person’s a priori express permission. In fact, it is desired that capture of imagery or au-
dio of any person other than the user be avoided even if a priori permission is granted. 
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turns into a social evil when it trains watchful, spying eyes needlessly 
and hurtfully. First, I will highlight privacy-related and other problems 
tied to memory; then I will consider privacy-related and other prob-
lems connected with surveillance.  
A. Pernicious Memory 
It is unclear precisely what lifelogging technology in common us-
age will be designed to do, precisely how popular it will become, and 
precisely how people will want to use the data they store.
35
 But we know 
already that people are drawn to documenting their experiences, and 
that nearly everyone has occasionally wished for a better memory.  
Lifelogging potentially enhances biological memory by enabling 
superior electronic records, replay, recall, and possible remembrance. I 
say “possible” remembrance because encountering a past experience 
need not cause one literally to remember it. Memory does not work 
that way. For example, I demand proof to substantiate a friend’s claim 
that I dressed badly in the 1970s—worse than everyone else. She 
shows me a photograph that settles the matter: I am standing astride a 
bicycle wearing a loud Indian print dress with a fringed hemline, ar-
gyle socks, wooden sandals and ski glasses. To this day I cannot recall 
ever donning that tacky getup, hopping on a bike, and stopping to chat 
with a friend carrying a camera. But it happened.  
The capacities to recall, to be reminded, and to review records of 
the past can be valuable. Imagine you are someone who often forgets 
the details of conversations you are expected to remember. Suppose 
that you could invisibly record and store conversations in electronic 
memory for convenient retrieval on demand.  
You could be spared plenty professional disapproval and social 
embarrassment. Now imagine that you are a psychotherapy patient 
trying to gauge the severity of a bout of depression experienced a few 
years back. Suppose you could retrieve lifelog data. Your lifelog re-
cords and recordings reveal that at times you were irritable and sad, 
but also that you were at times manic. With the help of the lifelog 
data, your therapist could confidently diagnose and treat you for a 
bipolar mood disorder.  
Despite the practical utility suggested by the foregoing illustra-
tions, electronic memory enhancement is not an unqualified good. 
Electronic memory enhancement enables destructive reminding and 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, for example, Liam J. Bannon, Forgetting as a Feature, Not a Bug: The Duality of 
Memory and Implications for Ubiquitous Computing, 2 CoDesign 3, 4 (2006) (“Examining the 
ways in which new technologies might augment human and social—and even political—activities 
in the future is a necessary, yet risky endeavor.”). 
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remembrance. The unredacted lifelog could turn into a bigger burden 
on balance than fallible biological memory cum conventional contem-
porary enhancements.  
1. Dredging up the past. 
I lose my temper and slap a dear friend at a party. My lifelog re-
cords the incident. After making amends and being forgiven, I decide 
to delete the episode from my log. The technology design allows for 
this. But a dozen other party guests have captured the slapping inci-
dent on their lifelogs, too. Suppose I do not have the technical ability 
to blot out all of their electronic memories of my misconduct at will. I 
cannot prevent acquaintances from someday throwing my fault in my 
face, leaking video evidence of my aggression to a potential lover or 
employer, and mass communicating my outburst all over the internet. 
Worldwide exposure is a possible outcome of a momentary lapse of 
judgment. Once a dust bin, history becomes a freezer.  
Lifelogging would extend the longevity of personal misfortune 
and error. Not only might an individual’s own lifelog problematically 
preserve a record of bad luck and mistake, the lifelogs of others with 
whom the individual has come into contact might do the same. Yet 
people typically have a legitimate moral interest in distancing them-
selves from commonplace misfortunes and errors.
36
 In order to create 
that distance, they need to be safe from memory: they need to forget 
and need others to forget, too.
37
  
Dredging up the past can hurt feelings, stir negative emotions, 
and ruin lives. We can see clearly the potential cruelty and harmful 
consequences of resurrecting the past in the fact patterns of a familiar 
line of privacy tort cases.
38
 
Melvin v Reid
39
 pitted a homemaker, who had once been a prosti-
tute wrongly accused of murder, against filmmakers who used her ac-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Uncommon errors such as perpetrating large-scale human rights atrocities are another 
matter. Adolf Hitler likely had no moral interest in distancing himself from his role in the Holocaust. 
 37 Some people will be better able—and more disposed—to accept and offer forgiveness 
than others, no matter how vivid the memories to which they have access. 
 38 The “dredging up the past” cases I have in mind date back to the 1930s. See text accom-
panying notes 39–42. Some of the more recent cases in the line include Willan v Columbia 
County, 280 F3d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir 2002) (finding no liability where police queried computer-
ized database maintained by the FBI’s National Crime Information Center and discovered that a 
mayoral candidate had been convicted of felony burglary in 1980’s in another state); Uranga v 
Federated Publications, 67 P3d 29, 35 (Idaho 2003) (finding no liability for republication of a 
forty-year-old court record associating the plaintiff with homosexuality); Hall v Post, 372 SE2d 
711, 717 (NC 1988) (finding no liability for publishing story about a woman who many years 
earlier had been married to a carnival barker and abandoned their child). 
 39 297 P 91 (Cal Ct App 1931). 
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tual maiden name in The Red Kimono, a movie based on her life.
40
 The 
Melvin court held that the policy interest of the state in rehabilitation 
justified allowing the woman’s privacy suit to stand.
41
 One of the most 
intriguing privacy tort cases of all time went the other, more typical, 
way. William James Sidis brought a lawsuit against The New Yorker 
magazine after a reporter weaseled into his apartment for an inter-
view and then published a story that belittled Sidis’ eccentricities and 
shabby circumstances.
42
 Mr. Sidis had been a celebrated child prodigy, 
the youngest person ever to attend Harvard, and a college graduate by 
age 16. Stressing the enormity of his past fame, the court held that a 
magazine story describing his descent into obscurity was newsworthy. 
A case of the same ilk, Briscoe v Reader’s Digest Association,
43
 was 
brought by a convicted armed hijacker turned solid citizen and parent 
who sued a newspaper for publishing a reference to his crime.
44
 The 
court left it to a jury to decide whether the hijacker’s past was news-
worthy. In all three cases, someone suffered humiliation and loss of 
standing in the community because someone else chose to bring up—
or as the victims might say, “dredge up”—the truths of their pasts.  
Current interpretations of tort law do not favor granting relief 
under privacy tort theories to people whose once-public pasts have 
been resurrected by the media for public comment and discussion. The 
First Amendment and the common law mandate wide freedom for 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id at 93: 
The use of appellant’s true name in connection with the incidents of her former life in the 
plot and advertisements was unnecessary and indelicate and a willful and wanton disregard of 
that charity which should actuate us in our social intercourse and which should keep us from 
unnecessarily holding another up to scorn and contempt of upright members of society. 
 41 But see Willan, 280 F3d at 1162 (“Anyway the Melvin case, paternalistic in doubting the 
ability of people to give proper rather than excessive weight to a person’s criminal history, is 
dead.”). The Supreme Court held in Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975), that the 
First Amendment creates a privilege to publish matters contained in public records even if publi-
cation would offend the sensibilities of a reasonable person. (The matter in question was the 
identity of a woman who had been raped and murdered.) 
 42 See Sidis v F-R Publishing Corp, 113 F2d 806 (2d Cir 1940). In Sidis, the court noted that 
The New Yorker article about the former prodigy was “merciless” and “ruthless,” but concluded that 
[r]egrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and “public figures” are sub-
jects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population. And when such 
are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in 
the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day. 
Id at 809. 
 43 483 P2d 34 (Cal 1971), overruled by Gates v Discovery Communications, Inc, 101 P3d 
552 (Cal 2004) (holding that a corporation was not liable to an offender for publishing facts 
obtained from public official records). 
 44 Briscoe, 483 P2d at 542 (“A jury might well find that a continuing threat that the reha-
bilitated offender’s old identity will be resurrected by the media is counter-productive to the 
goals of [rehabilitation].”). 
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speaking truth, accurate news reporting, and artistic expression. Yet, 
wherever the seclusion and private facts remedies appear on the 
books, a doctrinal framework for tort liability for lifelog-based disclo-
sures is in place.
45
 The crucial inquiry is whether judges and juries ex-
amining the facts would be likely to find that a lifelog data disclosure 
was “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and not newsworthy or 
otherwise of “legitimate interest to the public.”
46
  
It is conceivable that a state court could find a defendant liable 
under the intrusion or public disclosure of private fact torts for dredg-
ing up the past. The best case for liability would involve publication of 
information about a solitary private person secreted in his or her own 
lifelog or covertly captured in the lifelog of a trespassing spy (for ex-
ample, images of the person, depressed and weeping alone in front of 
a mirror in the bathroom). The lifelog technology imagined for the 
near future captures streams of shared experience, not the stream of 
consciousness. Embarrassing and humiliating lifelog recordings made 
at group events or in public places might fail to meet the standard of 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” in any court. There is a 
strong, if misguided, tendency in US law to discount the significance of 
privacy in public.
47
  
It is worth asking whether it is ethical for would be truth-tellers 
protected by the First Amendment and common law to stand on their 
                                                                                                                           
 45 North Carolina rejected the private fact tort in Hall, 372 SE2d at 717: 
We conclude that any possible benefits which might accrue to plaintiffs are en-
tirely insufficient to justify adoption of the constitutionally suspect private facts invasion of 
privacy tort which punishes defendants for the typically American act of broadly proclaim-
ing the truth by speech or writing. Accordingly, we reject the notion of a claim for relief for 
invasion of privacy by public disclosure of true but ‘private’ facts. 
 46 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977): 
652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
See also id § 652D(a)–(b): 
652D. Publicity Given to Private Life 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to li-
ability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that  
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 
 47 See Anita L. Allen, Uneasy Access 125–28 (Rowman & Littlefield 1988) (noting courts’ 
general unwillingness to recognize any broad right to privacy in public). See also Helen Nis-
senbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 L & 
Philosophy 559, 573–75 (1998) (citing examples of courts’ reluctance to allow one person’s pri-
vacy rights to encroach on the freedom of others). 
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rights, knowingly wounding people who are trying to forget their 
pasts.
48
 To get at an answer, consider what, if anything, made the plain-
tiffs’ privacy claims in Melvin, Sidis, and Briscoe ethically plausible. 
Why might an ethical truth-teller have even considered forbearance? 
Where was the harm, unfairness, or failure of character in doing what 
the law may or may not have allowed? To be sure, the unflattering 
information was archived in media and public records. But most peo-
ple did not have the information the plaintiffs wished to hide. It would 
have taken some dredging to uncover it. Hence the plaintiffs devel-
oped expectations of privacy and secrecy, around which they built 
their interpersonal relationships. This was especially true of the plain-
tiffs in Briscoe and Melvin, neither of whom had ever experienced 
national celebrity. Sidis had been a celebrity. With ready access to 
news archives, The New Yorker performed an easy dredge—a bit of 
investigative journalism—and then released information about Sidis 
into the world. The harm to him was shame, distortion, and unwanted 
attention as information flowed beyond preexisting “social net-
works.”
49
 The New Yorker violated “norms of appropriateness” by us-
ing deception to gain fresh access to Sidis, and norms of fair informa-
                                                                                                                           
 48 The ethical code promulgated by the Society of Professional Journalists exhorts journal-
ists to respect interests in seclusion, anonymity, and informational privacy as species of minimiz-
ing harm. See Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics (1996), online at http://www.spj.org/ 
ethicscode.asp (visited Jan 12, 2008): 
Journalists should: . . .  
• Show compassion for those who may be affected adversely by news coverage. Use spe-
cial sensitivity when dealing with children and inexperienced sources or subjects. 
• Be sensitive when seeking or using interviews or photographs of those affected by trag-
edy or grief. 
• Recognize that gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort. 
Pursuit of the news is not a license for arrogance. 
• Recognize that private people have a greater right to control information about them-
selves than do public officials and others who seek power, influence or attention. Only 
an overriding public need can justify intrusion into anyone’s privacy. 
• Show good taste. Avoid pandering to lurid curiosity. 
• Be cautious about identifying juvenile suspects or victims of sex crimes. 
• Be judicious about naming criminal suspects before the formal filing of charges. 
• Balance a criminal suspect’s fair trial rights with the public’s right to be informed. 
See also Anita L. Allen, Why Journalists Can’t Protect Privacy, in Craig LaMay, ed, Journalism 
and the Debate over Privacy 69 (Lawrence Erlbaum 2003) (observing the demise of the privacy-
protection norms among practicing journalists and explaining the practical limits on privacy 
protection). 
 49 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U Chi L Rev 919, 
988 (2005) (“Where a defendant’s disclosure materially alters the flow of otherwise obscure 
information through a social network, such that what would have otherwise remained obscure 
becomes widely known, the defendant should be liable for public disclosure of private facts.”).  
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tion “distribution” when it republished facts about Sidis younger peo-
ple did not know and most older people had forgotten.
50
  
2. The future of “the Past.” 
The limitations of memory combined with practical barriers to ef-
ficient dredging once made it rational to predict that much of the past 
could be kept secret from people who matter. And three short decades 
ago, reliance on expectations of substantial privacy about the past 
were highly reasonable. One could build a new life on a premise of de 
facto concealment. One could earn trust and honor. One could walk 
with dignity before others. Respecting expectations of privacy about 
the past in a world of mere human memory and mostly paper archives 
was an obligation that ethical principles of care and character would 
surely dictate.
51
  
The Supreme Court drew a parallel conclusion about legal obli-
gations and legal principles. In an oft-cited case, the Court interpreted 
the Freedom of Information Act’s
52
 (FOIA’s) privacy exemptions to 
protect individuals from the federal government releasing their crimi-
nal “rap sheets” to the media.
53
 Criminal histories are public data, the 
court argued, but data that ordinarily enjoys “practical obscurity.”
54
 
Thus “[t]he privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of 
rap-sheet information will always be high.”
55
 
In an era of electronic archives, traditional predictions and expec-
tations of privacy about the past have begun to look less reasonable. 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Compare Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash L Rev 119, 136 
(2004) (distinguishing norms of appropriateness and distribution norms for information disclosures). 
 51 But see H.J. McCloskey, The Political Ideal of Privacy, 21 Phil Q 303, 308–09 (1971). 
McCloskey argues that loving relationships create obligations of accountability. I agree with the 
principle that there may be relationships or categories of relationships in which secrecy about 
significant past behavior is ethically unacceptable. 
 52 Pub L No 89-554, 80 Stat 383 (1966), codified as amended at 5 USC § 552 (2000 & Supp 
2002). 
 53 DOJ v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 US 749, 771 (1989): 
The privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial. The substantial character of that interest is 
affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store informa-
tion that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person attains age 80, 
when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded. . . . [FOIA] Exemption 7(C), by its terms, permits 
an agency to withhold a document only when revelation “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 
 54 Id at 780. 
 55 Id: 
When the subject of such a rap sheet is a private citizen and when the information is in the 
Government’s control as a compilation, rather than as a record of “what the Government is 
up to,” the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while the 
FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir. 
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The changed social context—we are now in an “information age”—
works against former celebrities and felons hoping to conceal past 
fame or infamy. Information about the past is ready at hand. Much of 
the focus of information science is on how to eliminate practical ob-
scurity through electronic archive and retrieval. Electronic accessibil-
ity renders past and current events equally knowable. The very ideas 
of “past” and “present” in relation to personal information are in dan-
ger of evaporating. The past is on the surface, like skim. A former 
mayoral candidate unsuccessfully sued after police queried a comput-
erized database maintained by the FBI’s National Crime Information 
Center and learned the he had been convicted of felony burglary in 
1980s in another state.
56
 There is much less “dredging” to get to the 
past; only pointing and clicking to achieve replay.  
Today’s “Sidis” knows that anyone can access online databases to 
learn about others’ achievements, misfortunes, crimes, employment, 
affiliations, and publications. Curious neighbors or the media might 
Google Sidis for purposes unrelated to his interesting past, discover-
ing inadvertently, in an instant, that he had been an acclaimed child 
prodigy deemed to have a bright future.  
Information about ordinary people travels from the offline world 
onto cell phone cameras, onto YouTube, television talk shows, and 
Google. Today’s “Melvins” and “Briscoes” must expect their crimes to 
have a rich afterlife, not only in newspapers and government records, 
but in videos, telephones, weblogs, Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace, as 
well. Whole television programs are based on videos of crimes being 
committed—robberies, shootings, high-speed chases, sexual predation, 
and criminal solicitation.
57
 The 2007 Virginia Tech campus massacre
58
 
was documented in video and audio recordings made by Swedish ex-
change students, wounded victims, and by the suicidal murderer him-
self.
59
 These recordings made their way onto television and the web.  
As privacy and concealment become more difficult to obtain, 
they may come to matter less or differently. In a universe of cheap, 
massive lifelog data retention, individuals would perhaps come to un-
derstand digital capture and unwanted data disclosure as mundane 
risks, like swallowing bugs at a picnic. More radically, they may come 
to understand themselves, not as longitudinal well-integrated person-
alities but as ever-present navigable data streams no one fully controls.  
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Willan, 280 F3d at 1163. 
 57 See generally Deborah Jermyn, Crime Watching: Investigating Real Crime TV (I.B. Tauris 
2007). 
 58 Alessandra Stanley, Deadly Rampage and No Loss for Words, NY Times A19 (Apr 17, 2007). 
 59 See Howard Kurtz and Soledad O’Brien, The Massacre at Virginia Tech—Part 2, CNN 
(Apr 22, 2007).  
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Passwords, encryption, and other security measures will help to 
keep lifelog capta private. But social norms may fail to ascribe indi-
viduals the right to keep their own lifelogs sufficiently private from 
family and friends to securely protect their emotional lives and ca-
reers. And in any case, unless lifelog design moves in a very different 
direction than the MyLifeBits prototype, individuals will be featured 
in other people’s lifelogs, probably without a legal right to fully con-
trol how the data about them is used, shared, or construed.
60
 Existing 
state and federal wiretapping laws limit the right of law enforcers and 
private citizens alike to audio-record conversations without the con-
sent of at least one party.
61
 But videotaping is less stringently regu-
lated, and videotaping in public places, short of upskirting, harassment, 
or stalking, is rarely unlawful.
62
  
Lifelogs will be downplayed by some technology enthusiasts as 
an incremental rather than revolutionary change in the capacity to do 
what used to be called dredging up the past. Yet the change in data 
retention practices widespread lifelogging would entail would be revo-
lutionary. It is mainly the deeds of people of celebrity or accomplish-
ment that are amenable to discovery or recall with the help of an 
internet search engine or media archive. But lifelogging means the 
deeds of just about anyone can be stored, recalled, and shared by oth-
ers who get their hands on the files. 
Again, technologies are making the past easily and eternally pre-
sent. There is no onerous dredging, no “practical obscurity” sheltering 
scattered facts. Full-life lifelogging will likely lead to unwanted data 
collection, retention, and disclosures that may not be considered tor-
tious or otherwise unlawful under existing privacy law. And they 
might not even strike most people as unethical. Since the primary 
purpose of lifelogs will not be to destroy other people’s lives but to 
archive personal experience, it is unlikely at this juncture that innova-
tors, consumers, or policymakers will view the emotional injury and 
privacy invasion concerns raised by the technology as grounds for its 
suppression. It is desirable, though, that the technology and the social 
practices that surround its use take appropriate account of the prob-
lems in living that can stem from bringing up the past.  
                                                                                                                           
 60 The suggestion has been made that wearable anti–data capture technologies will be 
developed that can block the ability of other people’s lifeloggers to record one’s activity. See 
Cheng, Golubchik, and Kay, Total Recall at 88 (cited in note 19). 
 61 See, for example, Moore v Telfon Communications, 589 F2d 959, 965–66 (9th Cir 1978) 
(interpreting the federal wiretap act as prohibiting nonconsensual recording of telephone calls 
but permitting recordings that preserve evidence of a crime). 
 62 See, for example, United States v Torres, 751 F2d 875, 884–86 (7th Cir 1984) (holding that, 
while videotaping is not governed by the federal wiretap laws, Fourth Amendment considera-
tions may still apply). 
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B. Mental and Moral Health Hazards 
Improvements in mental health diagnosis could flow from the ac-
cessibility of lifelog data. Finally therapists could see and hear the be-
havior of clients not sick enough for monitoring in a hospital. Thera-
pists would have the equivalent of the Holter Monitor ambulatory 
electrocardiograph machine that cardiologists employ to detect subtle 
heart disease. Yet the vivid recall lifelogs will permit might turn out to 
be a psychological hazard.
63
 The lifelogging concept is insensitive to 
the therapeutic value of forgetting the details of experience.
64
 Trauma 
often needs to recede into near oblivion. Rumination about the past 
may need to be discouraged to make room for fresh experiences and 
perspectives. 
Lifelogging operates with a bias in favor of memory and the ca-
pacity for detailed recall of the past. Lifelogging designers may be 
thinking “documentary film” rather than “interpretative diary.” Will 
lifelogs allow the individual to mold and change her identity? A per-
son who has been successfully treated for post traumatic stress syn-
drome after returning from a bloody war may benefit from memories 
that have faded. A person who had come to terms with a childhood of 
sexual molestation may benefit from the loss of painful memories.
65
 
After sex reassignment, a person might wish to break with aspects of 
the opposite-sexed prior self. There may be an easy technological fix 
for this problem. Design the logging devices to allow people to turn 
them off in potentially trauma-inducing settings. Enable deletion of 
painful or dysfunctional recordings that have outlived their usefulness 
to the individual.  
Another psychological hazard is harder to fix: voluntary, but patho-
logical rumination.
66
 The technology will enable excessive rumination 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See, for example, Marc Augé, Oblivion 17 (Minnesota 2004) (Marjolijn de Jager, trans) 
(“One must know how to forget in order to taste the full favor of the present, of the moment, 
and of expectation.”). 
 64 See Jeanie Lerche Davis, Forget Something? We Wish We Could, WebMd (Apr 9, 2004), 
online at http://www.webmd.com/anxiety-panic/features/forget-something-we-wish-we-could (visited 
Jan 12, 2008). 
 65 See, for example, Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implica-
tions of Memory Dampening, 59 Vand L Rev 1561, 1595–98 (2006) (arguing that pharmacological 
memory dampening may be warranted as treatment for trauma victims and should not be 
avoided out of blind bias in favor of natural cognitive abilities). 
 66 Ellen McGrath, The Rumination Rut, Psych Today (Apr 11, 2003), online at 
http://psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-2687.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). See also Michael E. 
Addis and Kelly M. Carpenter, Why, Why, Why?: Reason-giving and Rumination as Predictors of 
Response to Activation- and Insight-oriented Treatment Rationales, 55 J Clinical Psych 881, 882–84 
(1999) (analyzing the connection between a patient’s explanation for his depression and the 
most effective treatment for that patient). 
File: 3 Allen Final 2.19 Created on: 2/19/2008 2:06:00 PM Last Printed: 2/19/2008 2:12:00 PM 
2008] Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance 65 
by persons experiencing unipolar or bipolar depression.
67
 The depressed 
individuals might constantly revisit and reify their repository of per-
ceived errors, slights, lost opportunities, and injustices. The therapist 
may find it especially difficult to persuade a patient that lifelogger capta 
are not fixed, “hard” evidence of an important whole story, but some-
thing partial, ambiguous, unimportant, and interpretable.  
Rumination and stress are not the only mental health related 
concerns. Persons affected by mental illness sometimes commit acts of 
horrific unkindness and violence when they are ill, for which they are 
sorry and the people they harm are willing to forgive.
68
 But how useful 
is forgiveness when there is a diminished capacity to forget?  
Indeed, the ability to move on from wrongdoing is something 
even wrongdoers not affected by mental illness may find it hard to do 
in a world of lifeloggers. The expectation that lifeloggers delete 
memories of offensive conduct for which others have forgiven them 
might someday emerge. Deleting data about my forgiven offenses 
from my lifelog may have less value, though, if the others around me 
do not delete their records of what I have done. But incomplete net-
working and communication means that information about wrongs 
will not be consistently followed up with information about moral 
repair. Another difficulty is asymmetry. The forgiven offender may be 
best served by data deletion, while the forgiving victim may be best 
served by data preservation. Some people are too forgiving of domes-
tic violence, harassment, and the like. It might be a good idea to replay 
the tapes, as it were, to spur caution. Victims may have a complex ethi-
cal duty to retain secret lifelog data of forgivable forgiven wrongs.  
C. Pernicious Surveillance 
I now turn from pernicious memory to pernicious surveillance. 
Lifelogs could someday become exceedingly comprehensive and sen-
sitive windows into a person’s life. They may be stored on standalone 
personal computing devices only or uploaded to the internet for more 
permanent and secure storage. They may be included in medical re-
cords, shared with friends, and aggregated with the lifelogs of others.  
A great deal of data about individuals is already collected and re-
tained, some by the individual, some by others. In the future the need 
                                                                                                                           
 67 A person predisposed to ruminate may do so excessively whether her memory bank is 
vast or nearly vacant. See Addis and Carpenter, 55 J Clinical Psych at 883 (cited in note 66). My 
speculation is that a culture of memory machines may exacerbate problems of pathological 
rumination. 
 68 See, for example, Kay Redfield Jamison, An Unquiet Mind 120–22 (Knopf 1995), in 
which a bipolar professor of psychiatry describes the violence, remorse, and forgiveness precipi-
tated by her own mental illness. 
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for personal lifelogging could be tempered by the fact that business 
and government will routinely and systematically collect detailed data 
about individuals for purposes of marketing, security, and social con-
trol. Moreover, because sousveillance is also surveillance, lifeloggers 
join the state and industry as fellow people-watchers.  
A lay person or surveillance professional could elect to share 
lifelog data featuring the conduct of others. The potential thus exists 
for using lifelog pervasive computing technology for purposes of spy-
ing on others.
69
 To “spy” is to monitor or investigate another’s beliefs, 
intentions, actions, omissions, or capacities, as revealed in otherwise 
concealed or confidential conduct, communications, and documents. 
Spying involves covert activity, though not necessarily lies or fraud. Al-
though some spying is virtuous rather than unethical, spying inherently 
involves taking advantage of those who place their confidence in the 
social norms that shape a cooperative communal life.
70
 Spying should be 
presumed wrong because it often uses secrecy to unfair advantage and 
interferes with the enjoyment of beneficial modes of personal privacy 
that individuals expect others to respect. Yet there are exceptions to the 
anti-spying principle: spying on others is ethically permissible, even 
mandatory, in certain situations where the ends are good. 
Spying is sometimes prompted by genuine obligations of caretak-
ing, such as monitoring an aging adult parent or teenager. Spying may 
be a way to prove a humiliating adultery, gather evidence against a cor-
porate crime, or expose a terrorist. Where spying is ethically permitted 
or required, there are ethical limits on the methods of spying. The virtu-
ous spy will violate privacy and transparency norms, but he or she will, 
to the extent possible, continue to act with respect for the moral auton-
omy and for the moral and legal interests of the investigative target.
71
 
This value attached to spying thus provides no justification or defense 
for recreational spying, whether using lifelog technology or more tradi-
tional means. Widespread lifelogging could increase the amount of il-
licit, unethical recreational surveillance to intolerable levels. 
There is no reason to think lifelogs will be immune from govern-
ment access or surveillance. On the contrary, there is every reason to 
think lifelogging will be a boon to the legal system and government 
surveillance. The sousveillant will be the true sibling of Big Brother. I 
reach this conclusion by taking notice of the spirit and letter of current 
federal surveillance policy. Current laws give the government access to 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See, for example, Jeffrey A. Lowe, Big Brother Will Be Watching: Lifelog Project Up Ad-
ministration’s Sleeve Threatens Privacy Rights of Every American, LA Daily J 6 (July 31, 2003). 
 70 Anita L. Allen, The Virtuous Spy, 91 Monist (forthcoming 2008), online at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010949#PaperDownload (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 71 Id. 
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virtually all means of communications and data storage. A government 
that has traditionally enjoyed access to communications and correspon-
dence will want access to lifelogs. Diaries are not off limits,
72
 and my 
prediction is that lifelogs will not be treated more favorably. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects information privacy, but in a case that is seldom applied.
73
 
Federal law and policy affirm the concept of search and seizure based 
on warrants and individualized suspicion, while allowing numerous 
exceptions in Fourth Amendment law, such as the “special needs” ex-
ceptions.
74
 Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
75
 
enhances Fourth Amendment protections, it regulates government 
access to communications, stored data, and communications transac-
tions records without barring access.
76
 The Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act
77
 also regulates rather than prohibits access to premises, 
tangible items, and communications.
78
 With National Security Letters, 
the government can subpoena business records and could presumably 
subpoena lifelog data from private businesses set up to systematize, 
transfer, or back up lifelog data.
79
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 72 See, for example, People v Miller, 60 Cal App 3d 849, 855 (1976) (“Contrary to defen-
dant’s contention, evidentiary use of the diary did not violate the constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination. The privilege does not prevent the otherwise lawful seizure of a document 
even when its contents are communicative.”). See also Andresen v Maryland, 427 US 463, 465 
(1976) (holding that business records properly seized could be admitted into evidence without 
violating the “Fifth Amendment’s command that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself’”); United States v Dawson, 516 F2d 796, 807 (9th Cir 
1975) (holding that the admission of a properly seized note from the defendant prisoner to another 
prisoner did not violate the defendant’s protection against self-incrimination); United States v Ben-
nett, 409 F2d 888, 897 (2d Cir 1969) (holding that a letter found during a lawful search, even though 
it was self-incriminating, could be admitted into evidence); People v Thayer, 408 P2d 108, 110 (Cal 
1965) (noting that self-incriminating writings can be seized and admitted into evidence). 
 73 See Whalen v Roe, 429 US 589, 599–600 (1977) (“The cases sometimes characterized as 
protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”). Several courts of appeals have vali-
dated Whalen’s informational privacy right. Helen L. Gilbert, Comment, Minors’ Constitutional 
Right to Informational Privacy, 74 U Chi L Rev 1375, 1381–88 (2007). 
 74 See, for example, Samson v California, 547 US 843 (2006) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment permits the search of a parolee without a warrant). 
 75 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848. 
 76 See id. 
 77 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as 
amended at 50 USCA § 1801 et seq (2007). 
 78 See id. 
 79 A National Security Letter is a secret administrative subpoena used by the FBI to ob-
tain information in private hands without obtaining a search warrant. As described by the FBI, 
“A National Security Letter” (NSL) is a letter request for information from a third party that is 
issued by the FBI or by other government agencies with authority to conduct national security 
investigations.” See FBI, Press Release on National Security Letters, online at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
pressrel/pressrel07/nsl_faqs030907.htm (visited Jan 12, 2008):  
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Designing the government out may not be a realistic option for 
technology innovators. In the 1990’s, industry effectively blocked full 
implementation of the Clipper Chip concept of government access to 
encrypted data.
80
 Yet, federal policy reflects the notion that new com-
munications technology design must allow for government access and 
surveillance. This is the spirit of CALEA, the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.
81
 CALEA compels the private 
sector to insure that new communications technologies do not thwart 
                                                                                                                           
NSL authority is provided by five provisions of law:  
• The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), for financial institution cus-
tomer records;  
• The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(a) and (b), for a list of financial insti-
tution identities and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting com-
pany;  
• The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, for a full credit report in an interna-
tional terrorism case. This provision was created by the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act;  
• The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for billing and transac-
tional communication service provider records from telephone companies and internet 
service providers; and  
• The National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 436, for financial, consumer, and travel records 
for certain government employees who have access to classified information. 
 80 President Bill Clinton’s White House announced the Clipper Chip Program in 1993. See 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, White House Clipper Statement (Apr 16, 1993), online 
at http://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper/white_house_statement_4_93.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
For a description of the Clipper Chip, see Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Clipper 
Chip (2001), online at http://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper (visited Jan 12, 2008): 
The Clipper Chip is a cryptographic device purportedly intended to protect private com-
munications while at the same time permitting government agents to obtain the “keys” 
upon presentation of what has been vaguely characterized as “legal authorization.” The 
“keys” are held by two government “escrow agents” and would enable the government to 
access the encrypted private communication. While Clipper would be used to encrypt voice 
transmissions, a similar chip known as Capstone would be used to encrypt data. The under-
lying cryptographic algorithm, known as Skipjack, was developed by the National Security 
Agency (NSA), a super-secret military intelligence agency responsible for intercepting for-
eign government communications and breaking the codes that protect such transmissions. 
In 1987, Congress passed the Computer Security Act, a law intended to limit NSA’s role in 
developing standards for the civilian communications system. In spite of that legislation, the 
agency has played a leading role in the Clipper initiative and other civilian security propos-
als, such as the Digital Signature Standard. 
 81 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub L No 103-404, 108 Stat 4279 
(1994). See also FCC, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) (2007), 
online at http://www.fcc.gov/calea (visited Jan 12, 2008): 
In response to concerns that emerging technologies such as digital and wireless communica-
tions were making it increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies to execute author-
ized surveillance, Congress enacted CALEA on October 25, 1994. CALEA was intended to 
preserve the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance by re-
quiring that telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications equip-
ment modify and design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they have the 
necessary surveillance capabilities. 
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law enforcement and its reach was recently extended to govern as-
pects of voice over internet protocol technologies.
82
 While data de-
struction is a command of at least one federal privacy statute,
83
 the 
federal government has sought to discourage automatic destruction of 
its own administrative records.
84
 The government has moved against 
                                                                                                                           
 
 82 See Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, In the Matter of 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, No 
04-295, *2 (May 3, 2006), online at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-56A1.pdf 
(visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 83 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 § 2(a)(2), Pub L No 100-618, 102 Stat 3195, codi-
fied at 18 USC § 2710(e) (2000): 
(e) Destruction of Old Records.—A person subject to this section shall destroy personally 
identifiable information as soon as practicable, but no later than one year from the date the 
information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected and there are 
no pending requests or orders for access to such information under subsection (b)(2) or 
(c)(2) or pursuant to a court order. 
 84 The federal government has complex record creation, disposal, and preservation guide-
lines. See National Archives, Frequently Asked Questions about Records Management in General 
(2001), online at http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/general.html (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
See, for example, Sue Dill Calloway, Record Retention Periods, HIPAAdvisory.com (2000), online 
at http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/recordretention.htm (visited Jan 12, 2008) (summarizing the 
federal document retention rules that are applicable to the private sector): 
There are a number of other record keeping laws required by the federal laws that have 
specific record-keeping requirements. These are as follows: 
• Fair Labor Standards Act: The Department of Labor requires employers to comply 
with several record-keeping regulations related to wages, hours, sex, occupation, condi-
tion of employment for three years. This concerns records containing employment in-
formation, payroll, and certificates and for two years of basic employment and earning 
records, wage rate tables, work time schedules, order shipping and billing records, job 
evaluations, merit seniority systems and other documents that explain wage differences 
to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment. This also includes any de-
ductions from or additions to pay. (29 CFR 516.2-516.6 and 516.11-29).  
• Occupations Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): OSHA requires employers to 
keep records of both medical and other employees who are exposed to toxic substances 
and harmful agents. Employers must maintain these records for 30 years. 
• Health and Human Services: Hospitals that participate in Medicare must keep medical 
records on each inpatient and outpatient, records of radiologic service, nuclear medi-
cine including records for the receipt and disposition of radipaharmaceutics for five 
years. (42 CFR 482.24, .26, and .53). Psychiatric hospitals must maintain special records 
including development of assessment/diagnostic data, treatment plan, record progress, 
discharge planning, and discharge summary for 5 years. 
• Health and Human Services: Facilities certified as comprehensive outpatient rehabilita-
tion facilities (CORFs) under the Medicare program must maintain clinical records to 
justify the diagnosis and treatment plan. These must be maintained for 5 years after the 
patient is discharged. (452 CFR 485.60). 
• Health and Human Services: Rural Health clinics that qualify for Medicare and Medi-
caid reimbursement must maintain medical records for at least six years from the date 
of the last entry. This retention period is longer in some states because they have a spe-
cific statute. 
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the destruction of library
85
 and ISP records.
86
 The trend in Europe fa-
voring mandatory private sector data retention is unlikely to remain 
on sister shores.
87
 
                                                                                                                           
 
• Health and Human Services: Nursing facilities must retain records for clinical records 
for five years from discharge if no state requirement. The medical records of minors 
must be kept for three years after they reach the age of majority. (42 CFR 483.75). 
• Health and Human Services: There are other many specific record retention require-
ments for various programs administered by the Public Health Service under 42 CFR, 
such as: 
 1.  Institutions receiving grants for research projects (52.8),  
2.  Public or not for profit hospitals or schools receiving National Heart, Lung, and  
     Blood institute grants under the National Cancer Research Demonstration Center.  
     (52.8), and  
3. Agencies receiving National Institute Grants (526.6). 
• Internal Revenue Service (IRS): Facilities should keep copies of employment tax re-
cords (Social Security documents) for four years after the due date of the tax. If a 
claimant files a claim, it should be for four years after the date of the filing. (26 CFR 
31.6001). 
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA): Investigators of new drugs are required to keep 
records to show they did not discriminate against workers because of their age. (29 
CFR 1627). Records of each employee with addresses, occupation, date of birth, and 
compensation earned must be kept for three years. Personnel records related to job ap-
plications such as promotion, physical examination results, aptitude tests, and adver-
tisements have to be kept for one year. 
• Employers Retirement Security Act: Any hospital or employer that has an employee 
benefit or pension plan must file a summary of the plan with the Department of Labor 
under the Employee Security Act of 1974 and keep records for not less than six years. 
(29 USC chapter 18). 
• Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act: Records must be kept for five years as re-
quired under this act for reports under the Welfare and Pension Plan. (29 USC 308). 
• Federal Employee’s Compensation Act: Hospitals and doctors who treat patients cov-
ered by this act must keep records of all injury cases including history, description of 
the injury, degree of disability, x-ray findings, treatment provided and other essential in-
formation. (20 CFR 10.410). This federal law only requires what information must be 
retained but not for how long. 
• Civil Rights Act and Equal Pay Act: Any employers that are covered by this act must 
maintain employment and personnel records of hiring, promotion, demotion, termina-
tion, transfer, layoff, pay raises, et al for six months from the making of the record of 
personnel action involved. They must be maintained until final disposition of any dis-
crimination case. (29 CFR 1602.14). 
 85 See American Library Association, FBI in Your Library (2007), online at 
http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/fbiyourlibrary.htm#news (visited Jan 12, 2008) (discussing gov-
ernment efforts to obtain access to library records, bookstores, and internet trials). 
 86 See James Plummer, “Data Retention”: Costly Outsourced Surveillance, TechKnowledge 
Issue No 99 (Cato Institute Jan 22, 2007), online at http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/070122-tk.html 
(visited Jan 12, 2008):  
The Justice Department has been beating the drums since last spring for a “data retention” 
law that would require Internet service providers to warehouse records of their customers’ 
online activity for the convenience of government investigators. Most recently, FBI Direc-
tor Robert Mueller called for such a measure at a law-enforcement convention last Octo-
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D. Avoiding Memory and Surveillance: Some Proposals 
Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin examined the ethics of lifelog-
ging and came up with an ironic solution to the problems of psycho-
logically risky mechanical sousveillance and sousveillance-aided gov-
ernment surveillance: infuse lifelogging systems with “imperfection, loss 
and error.”
88
 The developers of MyLifeBits have also broached this pos-
sibility, to reduce the attractiveness of lifelogs to the government.
89
  
Dodge and Kitchin reject “the aim of pervasive computing enthu-
siasts to create a unified, autobiographical (first person) lifelog for 
each individual through digital technologies that are always on, com-
municate with each other without human instruction or invention, and 
are so pervasive that they cover all aspects of human activity and be-
come so banal as to be seemingly invisible.”
90
 They embrace a modi-
fied conception of lifelogs. The lifelogs they embrace would be owned 
by the individual adult subject. But since ownership cannot guarantee 
control and the assurance of only personal uses, they propose to make 
them less functional. 
To reduce the incentives for others (including the government) to 
seek access to individuals’ lifelogs, Dodge and Kitchin propose design-
ing lifelogs to function imperfectly, not unlike biological memory. In 
particular, they propose that the devices have the capacity to “block” 
the recording of some details, “forget” details over time, and “tweak” 
memory of the past by misrecording precisely when, where, and how 
                                                                                                                           
ber. But the idea has found vocal proponents on both sides of the aisle. Data retention may 
rear its head again in the 110th Congress. 
See also Peter Fleischer and Nicole Wong, Taking Steps to Further Improve Our Privacy Prac-
tices, The Official Google Blog (Mar 14, 2007), online at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/03/ 
taking-steps-to-further-improve-our.html (visited Jan 12, 2008):  
Today we’re pleased to report a change in our privacy policy: Unless we’re legally required 
to retain log data for longer, we will anonymize our server logs after a limited period of 
time. When we implement this policy change in the coming months, we will continue to 
keep server log data (so that we can improve Google's services and protect them from se-
curity and other abuses)—but will make this data much more anonymous, so that it can no 
longer be identified with individual users, after 18–24 months. 
 87 On March 15, 2006 the European Union adopted Council Directive 2006/24/EC, 105 Off 
J Eur Communities 54, 54, mandating “the retention of data generated or processed in connec-
tion with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC” for a period of up to two years. 
The Directive covers all telephony (land, cell, internet) and internet communications (email). 
See id at 57 (“The obligation to retain data . . . shall include the retention of the data . . . relating 
to unsuccessful call attempts where those data are generated or processed, and stored (as regards 
telephony data) or logged (as regards Internet data), by providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services.”). 
 88 See Dodge and Kitchin, 34 Envir & Planning B: Planning & Design at 442 (cited in note 5). 
 89 Wilkinson, Remember This?, New Yorker at 38 (cited in note 1). 
 90 Dodge and Kitchin, 34 Envir & Planning B: Planning & Design at 435 (cited in note 5). 
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certain events took place.
91
 Fallibility of the lifelog will benefit the in-
dividuals who own it, too. Free from an “unforgiving” and “merciless” 
memory machine, persons are able to “evolve their social identities, to 
live with their conscience, to deal with ‘their demons’, to move on 
from their past to build new lives, to reconcile their own paradoxes 
and contradictions, and to be part of society.”
92
 The Dodge-Kitchin 
solution works well only if all lifelogs are designed with the features 
they recommend. Otherwise, a best friend’s or spouse’s lifelog might 
provide the sort of veridical evidence for a government investigation 
that one’s own lifelog has been designed to thwart. A world in which 
only the fallible, fading, reality-tweaking version of the lifelog is in cir-
culation is a more “private” world than the world in which veridical 
loggers are also in use.  
There is still time to optimally design full-life lifelogging products. 
Consumers are not yet clamoring for “perfect” memory full-life life 
loggers. But given the choice between a Dodge-Kitchin lifelogger and 
a veridical Total Recall lifelogger, I suspect most consumers would go 
for the latter, despite the attendant problems of privacy. If Jim and Jill 
are sentimental lovers who first met at Starbucks on a Tuesday morn-
ing, they will not want their lifelogs to have created both inaccurate 
and inconsistent accounts of their fateful encounter. The “unforgiving” 
and “merciless” veridical lifelog technology will have gargantuan ap-
peal to consumers, the government, and the health, research, and 
commercial sectors. One’s physician cannot be helped with data about 
blood pressure and heart-rate that may be accurate, but, then again, 
may not be. The precise color of the item you purchased at Target and 
the date are the sort of precise, accurate data the commercial sector 
wants to collect. 
Designers of the “Total Recall” veridical lifelog technology be-
lieve its “high level goal is to improve quality of life.”
93
 They recognize 
the privacy issues raised by the continuous environmental recording 
aspect of Total Recall. They have even considered the possibility that 
lifelogging recording technology might violate wiretapping laws, other 
privacy statutes, or fair information practice consent standards. But 
they seem to find solace in their observation that people in public 
places lack “reasonable expectations of privacy.”
94
 They do not have 
much to say about how people should be expected to cope, individu-
ally or as a community, with “a qualitative change in the heretofore 
ephemeral nature of quotidian activity” caused by the “overlapping 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id at 441. 
 92 Id at 443. 
 93 Cheng, Golubchik, and Kay, Total Recall at 87 (cited in note 19). 
 94 Id. 
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web” of recorded memories that would stem from lifelog use that has 
become as common as the cell phone.
95
 Their point may be that socie-
ties will adjust much as they have adjusted to the ubiquitous digital 
cameras, video cameras, and the chatting, chiming, and distraction 
caused by mobile telephones and PDAs—bugs don’t stop the picnic.
96
 
The Total Recall team predicts and embraces the fact that lifelog-
ging recordings will fall into the hands of the state. Indeed, part of 
their social design concept for lifelogs is that they are “available to the 
judicial system.”
97
 They note with seemingly uncritical acceptance that 
“the political climate supports access to information by law enforce-
ment even without judicial intervention.”
98
 They speculate that Total 
Recall recordings will be admissible as veridical under the rules of 
evidence because of the “legitimate needs for the data” and that they 
probably would not be subject to Fifth Amendment exclusion because 
they would not be “testimonial.”
99
 Rather than “degrade” the utility of 
the lifelog out of concerns about privacy and government access, the 
Total Recall team has labored to imagine design features that ac-
knowledge privacy interests in turning lifeloggers on, off, and away, 
while insuring the capacity to preserve verifiably authentic, unmodi-
fied recordings. It is that very capacity, preserved at all, that consti-
tutes the threat. 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate dream of lifelogging is to create and preserve a 
complete and useable record of one’s own life. Andy Warhol got his 
museum, and many other people would like to have the cyber equiva-
lent. The point of a lifelog need not be social critique, self-
aggrandizement, or immortality. It could be entertainment, sharing, or 
improving health or personal insight. Yet, whatever the motives for 
lifelogging, creating such a record has troubling implications for privacy, 
moral repair, mental health, and the ideal of limited government.
100
 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. 
 96 See, for example, Scott Carlson, On the Record, All the Time, Chronicle of Higher Educa-
tion A31, A33–35 (Feb 9, 2007) (examining practical social issues posed by audio and video 
lifelogging). But see generally Gaia Bernstein, When Technologies Are Still New: Windows of 
Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 Vill L Rev 921 (2006) (remarking that legal norms and 
technological protections of privacy may be inferior to aptly timed “social shaping” whereby 
privacy protecting practices and incentives are integrated into appropriate settings.). 
 97 Cheng, Golubchik, and Kay, Total Recall at 88 (cited in note 19). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See, for example, Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv L Rev 737, 784–85 
(1989) (defending a principle that individual rights should be ascribed to prevent government 
becoming totalitarian). 
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Comprehensive full-life lifelogging technology does not yet exist 
outside the laboratory and is not, therefore, ripe for legal rules and 
regulation. Yet ethical limitations and design parameters suggest 
themselves.
101
 No one should be required to keep a lifelog. No one 
should be suspected for not keeping a lifelog. Personal lifelogs should 
be deemed the property of the person or persons who create them. No 
one should record or photograph others for a lifelog without the con-
sent of the person or their legal guardian. A countertechnology to 
block lifelog surveillance should be designed and marketed along with 
lifeloggers. The owner/subject of a lifelog should be able to delete or 
add content at will. No one should copy a lifelog or transfer a lifelog 
to a third party without the consent of its owner. 
We must hope that the changes in the quality of life affected by 
the proliferation of lifelogs will not result in a further deterioration of 
the taste for privacy or fewer legal privacy protections. Existing pri-
vacy laws pertaining to intrusion, publication, communication, search 
and seizure, surveillance, data protection, and identity should be pre-
sumed to apply to lifelogs. Existing intellectual property laws should 
be presumed to apply to lifelog content. These presumptions may 
prove unworkable or merely unpopular. For better or for worse, one 
must anticipate that the law will not create a special shroud of privacy 
for lifelogs. It is likely that lifelogs—by analogy to functionally similar 
personal papers, recordings, data, and communications—will be sub-
ject to the legal rules of document creation, retention, and destruction; 
litigation discovery; government search and seizure; government ad-
ministrative subpoena; self-incrimination; privilege; and professional 
ethics. To encourage cautious, self-aware use, the legal risks of lifelog-
ging should be emphasized by those who design, create, and market 
the new technologies. 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See generally DARPA, LifeLog Modification 3 (cited in note 34). 
